Friday, May 22, 2009

Why Leonard Didn't Win

The fight between Marvelous Marvin Hagler and Ray Leonard, held in 1987, in Las Vegas, a cursed city for the Marvelous One (recall the travesty of justice that is the first Hagler-Antuofermo fight), remains controversial more than 20 years after Leonard was awarded a split decision. Public opinion is divided between those who believe Hagler won (an increasing majority), those who believe Leonard won (a dwindling minority), and those who believe the fight was a draw (a bold first step to righting their opinion). The fight was controversial because of the score cards. But the fight remains controversial for one simple reason: Hagler was robbed.

Those who cling to the opinion that Leonard won or that it was close do so because they were taken in by the charm and tricks of Leonard. They actually thought Leonard was winning because he was surviving. They actually believed that the spinning, low hitting, slapping, flurrying, mugging, shuffling - all things that have nothing to do with boxing - was something worthy of merit. Many of them, with the passage of time, know he lost; but they have argued so stridently for so long that he won, they were so convinced at the time that Leonard beat Hagler because their man didn't lose, that they cannot now bring themselves to admit that they were wrong. There are honest people. Referee Richard Steele admits that every time he watches the fight it gets closer. Steele is moving, step by step, towards the truth. Many of those who stopped watching the fight that night and watched Leonard instead are revisiting their opinion when distances allows them to actually watch the fight.

Hagler beat Leonard because he won more rounds. He was the effective aggressor. He landed the harder shots. He hurt Leonard on several occasions. He made the fight. He came to fight. He beat Leonard. That what this sport is about. It's not about flurrying and running. Leonard was a rabbit in there, and rabbits aren't supposed to win boxing matches.

I begin my analysis with the scorecards. Here's Lou Filippo's card:
Hagler: 9, 9, 10, 10, 10, 9, 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 9
Leonard: 10, 10, 9, 9, 9, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10
That's 115-113 Hagler. Perhaps Filippo gave the final two rounds to Leonard because he thought that a score of 117-111 would be viewed as excessive. I will discuss the first four rounds in detail later on. Suffice to say, I don't find Filippo's scoring accurate over these rounds. I also disagree with his score for round six. Suppose he gave Hagler round 12, as did the other two judges. That is a score of 116-112. In any case, he awarded the fight to the actual winner, so good for him.

Here's Dave Moretti card:
Hagler: 9, 9, 9, 9, 10, 9, 10, 10, 10, 9, 9, 10
Leonard: 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 10, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10, 9
That's 115-113 Leonard. Moretti awarded the fight to the actual loser. He gave Leonard the first four rounds. This put Hagler in a hell of predicament. He would have to win most of the rounds that followed. Note that he gave Hagler the last round. Had Moretti given at least one of the first four rounds to Hagler, it would have been a draw.

Here's Jo Jo Guerra card:
Hagler: 9, 9, 9, 9, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 10
Leonard: 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 9
That's 118-110 Leonard. This scorecard is scandalous. Guerra gave Leonard rounds 6 through 11. To award Leonard all of those rounds is to completely leave the planet. This also means that his grasp of the first four rounds - in which he gives Leonard every single one - is meaningless, completely discredited by his scoring of the other rounds. And why did he give Hagler the 12th? Could it be that he figured he would look even more like a loon if scored the fight 119-109?

Essentially the fight is a two card fight, with one judge finding for Hagler by two points and the other judge finding for Leonard by two points. One can reject outright Guerra’s card as fraudulent. Something was going on there. But even Moretti's card is hardly arguably correct.

Here's my card:
Hagler: 9, 10, 10, 9, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 9, 10
Leonard: 10, 9, 9, 10, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10
117-112 Hagler. I scored round 12 even. This was because Leonard was elusive at first and landed a lot of combinations, while Hagler was the aggressor and came on strong in the end. Oddly, both Moretti and Guerra give that round to Hagler, while Filippo does not. However, I think in all cases, this was a psychological attempt to keep their scores from looking what they perceived to be too lopsided. Leonard edged round 11, as Hagler was tiring. I will discuss the first four rounds in greater detail late. However, whatever may be said about the first four rounds, from the fifth round through the tenth round, Hagler dominated the fight. Note that all the judges gave Leonard the sixth round. This was the round that Dundee screamed loudly, “I want you off those ropes. It looks like he’s hitting you.” This line stuck in everybody’s mind. But in fact, it didn't just look like Hagler was hitting Leonard. He was hitting Leonard. Close round, but Hagler edges it. Nonetheless, suppose I give the round to Leonard. Now my score card reads 116-113, still a clear victory for Hagler. Consider how many more rounds I have to flip to give the fight to Leonard. One can't honestly get there. At best, one can come somewhere close to Filippo's card, which nevertheless awarded the fight to Hagler. Something is clearly wrong in the scoring of the other two judges.

How did some reporters come up with a draw? Let’s suppose that we generously give Leonard all four of the first rounds and score the final round for Hagler as did two of the judges. Leaving every thing as I saw it, it's a draw. I have to admit that, although I would have disagreed with a draw decision, it would have allowed Hagler to retain his title. While an injustice would have occurred, the robbery of Hagler's world championship belt would not have.

I now want to move to a discussion of the several false notions about this fight. I call these false notions myths because people repeat them as if they were bits of religious doctrine.

The first myth is the claim that Hagler gave away the first four rounds. Gil Clancy, who was a vocal commentator during the fight on the pay-per-view broadcast, kept chanting “Rounds in the bank for Leonard, Tim. Rounds in the bank.” But, if you watch the fight - and turn off the sound off if you are influenced by biased commentators - you will see Leonard does not actually win all four rounds. Moreover, the two he does win are very close.

One may reasonably score first round for Leonard, particularly if that person is adverse to scoring even rounds. Leonard lands a significant punch. Not much else happens in that round. Leonard is running. However, Hagler wins round two. He catches Leonard coming in several times. He rips uppercuts in close. He pounds the body with a free hand. Leonard clutches and scores a noise point with an amateurish overhand right. Leonard's only moments in this round come at the very end (part of Leonard's game plan). Moreover, the first half and then some of the third round is all Hagler. Leonard lands only one meaningful shot, another loud slapping overhand right. Leonard does well over the final third of that round, holding and hitting while shutting down Hagler's offense somewhat, but it's not enough to win the round. He mostly accomplishes this by a clutching style reminiscent of Sammy Angott. The 4th round is close, but Leonard might have edged it with his ability to control some of the action and a big combination at the end. Two low blows, though, and lots of holding, mar the round for Leonard. Steele could have done more to stop Leonard's fouling. At any rate, there goes that myth. Moretti and Guerra's scorecards are just not sustainable on the basis of the empirical evidence.

The second myth assumes the first myth is true and goes on to claim that Hagler blows the first four rounds because he boxes from the orthodox stance. This claim is easily subjected to empirical falsification. For two and one-third rounds out of the four first rounds, Hagler fights as a southpaw. Get your hands on a stop watch, cue up the tape, have somebody mark the stance used, then add up the seconds. Hagler does what he has always done: he switches stances. A false claim is related to this second myth, namely that Hagler is not effective in the orthodox stance. If you focus on Hagler in watching these four rounds, you will see that he is more effective in the orthodox stance in round two than he is as a southpaw in round four. On balance, Hagler is effective from either stance throughout the fight.

The third myth is that Hagler showed Leonard too much respect and fought a subdued fight. Observers say this is a pattern with Hagler when he faces great fighters, and they cite the Duran fight as a case in point. In the Duran fight, the only other other fight of Hagler's 13 title defenses that went the distance, Duran's reputation is said to have made Hagler wary. However, Hagler’s performances against both Duran and Leonard are more typical of the way he fought most of his career. He has always been a boxer first. Observers have developed a false memory of Hagler because of his high profile shootouts with Minter, Hamsho, Hearns, and Mugabi. Hagler could brawl, as he proved in those fights, but he was not ordinary a brawler. Besides, he dominated Duran. The cards were close, but the fight wasn't. Wasn't that fight in Las Vegas?

A fourth myth is that Leonard performed some kind of psyche job on Hagler before the fight. The same argument is made about Leonard's rematch with Duran. Leonard, it is claimed, made Duran quit via his super mental powers. Leonard, the legend goes, really knew how to get inside a fighter's head. The reality, as anybody who cares to take an objective look at the matter knows, Duran was sick to his stomach. He spent the night in the hospital after the fight because of a gut ailment. Leonard didn't make him quit. Nobody makes Duran quit. Leonard didn't psyche Hagler out, either.

Now, Hagler was slow. There's no question about that. It is almost universally admitted to that had the two faced one another in their primes, Hagler would have won going away. Ironically, those who admit this want to deny the obvious: that Hagler was way passed his prime, but Leonard wasn't. They make so much out of Leonard's three year layoff, while ignoring the reality that while Leonard was taking years off his body in the ring, and was still a relatively young man at 30 years of age, Hagler was an aging shopworn middleweight.

Those who deny Hagler's condition point out that he was 32 at the time of the fight. But I have uncovered evidence that strongly suggests - I believe proves - that Hagler is much older than that. Hagler claims he was born on May 23, 1954. But consider this passage from, an from the Oakland Tribune (Oakland, California), dated Saturday, August 31, 1974, page 20:

Marvin Hagler, the 1973 National Amateur Athletic Union middleweight champion, dumped 1972 Olympic Gold Medal winner Sugar Ray Seales from the unbeaten pro ranks with an easy 10-round boxing decision Friday night in a television studio bout. Hagler, 21, posted his 18th consecutive pro victory.
If in fact Hagler were born on May 23, 1954, he would have been 20 years old on August 31, 1974, not 21 years old as reported in the Tribune. However, Hagler was more likely 22 years old at the time, with the Oakland Tribune looking at an old press sheet from before Hagler’s most recent birthday, a common error in reporting ages in fights. Press sheets are often not updated for months after a fighter had a birthday. This is often on purpose, to give the appearance that the fighter is more youthful. Many fighters have lied about their ages - Archie Moore, Jersey Joe Walcott - for this reason.

An Associated Press in the News Journal or Mansfield, Ohio, dated Monday, May 14, 1973, page 17 lists Hagler’s age at 20:

“BOSTON (AP) – Marvin Hagler, a 20-year-old southpaw slugger voted the outstanding fighter in the 85th National AAU boxing championships, is going for the money. "I'm turning pro," Hagler said after winning the 165-pound AAU title "I'll never get to the Olympics. I'm working as a machinist apprentice.”
If Hagler was born on May 23, 1954, then the Associate Press should have listed his age at 18 years. He would have been nine days shy of his 19th birthday on May 14, 1973. But here is is nine days shy of the 21st birthday. In other words, he was born on May 23, 1952, two years earlier than he now claims.

I could summarize and quote literally hundreds of newspapers showing the same facts. Either Hagler is listed as born on May 23, 1952 or (a few) papers miss his latest birthday looking off an old press sheet. Whatever they say, they do not report that he was born on May 23, 1954. This is something that only appears later, as the aging warrior and his management team strive to keep that youthful appearance about him. Hagler may even be old than this, if we consider that his late start has motivated him to reset his age more than once.

So the facts indicate that Leonard, a outstanding fighter (Olympic champion, two-time welterweight champion and junior middleweight champion) without a lot of wear and tear on his body (short career and a three-year layoff), who had been engaging for months in mock fights under the guidance of one of the outstanding trainers in the history of the sport, Angelo Dundee, faced a 34, maybe even 35-year-old warrior who had been through wars with some of the roughest and hardest punching middleweights that division has every produced - Bennie Brisco, who had registered 50 knockouts in his 60 victories by the time he faced Hagler; Fulgencio Obelmejias, who was undefeated in 30 fights the first time he met Hagler, 27 of those wins coming by way of knockout, and entered the rematch with a record of 38-1 with 35 knockouts; the rugged Mustafa Hamsho between the Obelmejias fights; Juan Roldan, who sported a fantastic record of 52-2-2, with 37 knockouts; Tommy Hearns, arguably the hardest right handed hitter the sport has ever seen, coming into the first with a record of 40-1 with 34 knockouts; and John Mugabi, who entered the ring undefeated in 25 fights, every one of those fights coming inside the distance. These fights are recorded as some of the most brutal ring ways in the divisions history.

Hagler had the fortune from the standpoint of history to be champion during an remarkably competitive period - it is his resume that puts him as the top of the middleweight pantheon - but the misfortune of attempting the long pursuit of Carlos Monzon's illustrious record of fourteen consecutive title defenses amid such a sea of talent. It was clear to all that Hagler was past his prime in the Mugabi fight, a fight he likely would have won easily two or three years earlier (but which was much more entertaining because hagler had lost a step). Hagler was ready to be taken. If not Leonard, then soon. It was hard to see how he would overtake Monzon given his age and his condition. This was Hagler in the twilight of his career. There are shots he could’ve taken but didn’t.

A fifth myth is the claim that Leonard controls the action throughout the fight. All one needs to do here is get out their stop watch again and compute the number of minutes Hagler is on offense and backing Leonard up. Hagler mixes punches downstairs and upstairs. He makes Leonard miss and blocks a lot of punches with his gloves. He lands the most damaging blows. He presses the action. Round after round Hagler pile up points, while Leonard backpedals. These are facts. One only needs to put aside their bias and record the facts.

Here is the character of the fight: Leonard is running, clowning, and fighting the last 15-30 seconds of the round to impress the judges. Leonard slaps and punches low. He does most of the clinching. He is constantly holding and hitting on the breaks. Most of his punches miss, hit Hagler's gloves, or graze the top of Hagler's bald head. Leonard lands a few decent punches, no question, but Hagler lands many more clean punches. Leonard is desperate and out of breath through much of the fight. Unless he's running, he’s not really moving effectively. He is clearly frustrated in several rounds. He can't stay in and box because Hagler is catching him. So he goes into survival mode on his bicycle. What opportunities Leonard has to catch Hagler, he can't think fast enough to go after him. Dundee is screaming at Leonard to counterpunch. He chastises Leonard between rounds for allowing three missed punches to go unanswered. That is the whole strategy - run, flash, and counterpunch. But Hagler disrupts the plan with constant effective aggression and good defense despite his age and slowness. Leonard grabs, spins, and pushes, and tries to take advantage of the situation, but he can't.

Through the sixth round Leonard lands only fourteen more punches than Hagler according to punchstat records The punchstat guys are being generous, as many of the punches Leonard "lands" are actually bouncing harmlessly off Hagler's gloves and forearms. Hagler's punches are by far the cleaner and more damaging. Hagler misses a lot of punches, to be sure, but that was because he is throwing way more leather than Leonard. Through 6 rounds Leonard throws around 250 punches, whereas Hagler throws more the 300. Hagler has always thrown punches in bunches and has always missed a lot. Trusting punchstat, what does that average out to, anyway? Fewer than 3 more punches a round? Hardly the commanding performance and Gil and the audience think they’re seeing. Hagler is hitting Leonard from all directions. Right hooks, straight rights, uppercuts inside, mixing body to head. Leonard is shoeshining.

Through round 8, if you are scoring the fight on all the relevant fine points of scoring, Hagler is winning by a score of 80 to 74. The closest round is round 5, and even Dundee thinks Leonard loses that one because Hagler takes over in the second half and wobbles Ray with clean shots. Round 6 is close, but Hagler lands the better punches and controls the pace. Leonard does a lot of holding and hitting and Steele warns him twice. You can see he's getting tired and desperate. Hagler wins rounds 7 and 8 big. He is nailing Leonard with clean shots and controlling the tempo. Leonard's punches have nothing on them and most of the bounce off of Hagler's gloves and forearms. Leonard can't even steal any rounds late he’s too tired, although he tries in the eighth. The announcers can be heard hoping Leonard will get his second wind, all the while Gil is going on about how Leonard is moving beautifully. In fact, Leonard isn't moving beautifully at all. He is tired and taking big shots. The writers at KO Magazine also tried to rationalize Leonard founding as some sort of poetry. The bias for Leonard at the time was sickening, frankly. The boxing world so wanted another Ali.

The coverage of the match is very biased. The director of the HBO broadcast shows Leonard's punchstat numbers through round 10 but not Hagler's. Go back and watch the tapes. Hagler is nailing Leonard in rounds 9 and 10, so it's all the more suspicious that they choose to leave out the punchstat numbers. Hagler has Leonard rocking and rolling in these rounds. Leonard is tired. Hagler wins round 9 huge. Leonard has some moments in round 10 because Hagler is tiring, but Hagler still outpunches him. Hagler slows considerably in round 11. He is getting tired and Leonard is picking up the pace. The round is arguably a draw. Leonard lands some fast clean shots, but Hagler's attack is constant pressure and he lands bunches in bunches. Round 12 is a draw. Leonard is mostly running, but he jumps in with impressive combinations. Hagler comes on and has him hurt in the last 30 or so seconds, but was it enough to steal the round?

The final punchstat numbers were 792 thrown by Hagler, 291 landing, and 629 punches thrown by Leonard, with 306 landing. That is a difference of only 15 more punches landed by Leonard. The quality of these punches were inferior to the punches hagler landed. Moreover, the punchstat technicians appear to have undercounted Hagler's punches, marking too many of the thrown punches as missed punches.

The ringside press saw it this way. The New York Times saw it as a draw, as did the New York Post, and the Washington Post (114 all). The New York Daily News (117-111), the Houson Chronicle (115-114), the Boston Globe (117-111), the Boston Herald (116-113), the Oakland Tribute (117-112), and the Baltimore Sun (7-5), saw the fight in Leonard's favor. The Associated Press (117-112), Newsday (115-114), San Jose Mercury News (116-115), and the Chicago Tribune (7-5) all saw it for Hagler. That's three draws, six for Leonard, and four for Hagler. Thus only six out of thirteen major papers and a wireservice thought Leonard won the fight. True, only four of the thirteen called it for Hagler. But had the scores reflected the majority who called it either a draw or a win for Hagler, the title wouild not have changed hands. And, for the record, the Associated Press has been closer to actual scores of fights than any other source over the past several decades.

Here is the way Hugh McIvanney encapulated the injustice of the fight in an article for Sports Illustrated, aptly titled, "The illusion of Victory"

It is not only in Las Vegas that professional boxing's system of scoring shows all the intellectual consistency of a rolling pair of dice.

Don't blame the desert air for the rush of blood to the brain that caused Jose Juan (Jo Jo) Guerra, a WBC judge, to make Sugar Ray Leonard a winner by 10 rounds to 2 over Marvin Hagler while another official, Lou Filippo, was giving the April 6 fight at Caesars Palace to Hagler 7 rounds to 5. If the record of judges sanctioned by its State Athletic Commission is anything to go by, Nevada is a congenial environment for officials with the glorious eccentricity of mind brought to his work by Guerra. But bad decisions know no boundaries.

The simple truth is that at this stage of its long and erratic history, prizefighting is still nowhere near establishing any consistently accurate means of measuring performance. If the comparative effectiveness of two fighters is so difficult to calibrate (or so open to extravagantly subjective interpretations) that Guerra and Filippo can contradict each other as outrageously as they did, then even when everybody stays honest, boxing clearly carries a far higher risk of recurring injustice than any other sport.

When judges talk about focusing on paramount criteria—on identifying effective aggressiveness, clean punching, ring generalship and quality defense—they are merely emphasizing the complexity, perhaps the impossibility, of the exercise. Much of the time all they can do is review a fighter's performance, much as a theater critic would an actor's, making the pseudoscientific adjustment of putting their impressions into figures.

No one has ever understood the boxing judge as reviewer of theater better than Sugar Ray Leonard. Even Muhammad Ali, who substituted histrionics for real fighting often enough in the latter part of his career, was usually more concerned with disconcerting his opponent and getting the crowd on his side. Leonard sought those dividends too against Hagler. But the overriding priority for him appeared to be the manipulation of official minds.

Naturally, to achieve that end, Ray had to bring a lot to the party. Physically and mentally, he was astonishingly strong, sharp and resilient after what had been, essentially, a five-year layoff.

Thus, looking and moving so much better than anyone had a right to expect, Leonard was in a position to exploit the Schulberg Factor. This phenomenon—a compound optical illusion—may not have been discovered by Budd Schulberg, the novelist and fight aficionado, but he receives credit here for pointing it out to a few of us who were asking ourselves how Hagler came to be so cruelly misjudged. Budd's reasoning was that people were so amazed to find Sugar Ray capable of much more than they imagined that they persuaded themselves he was doing far more than he actually was.

Similarly, having expected extreme destructiveness from Marvin, they saw anything less as failure and refused to give him credit for the quiet beating he administered.

What Ray Leonard pulled off in his split decision over Hagler was an epic illusion. He had said beforehand that the way to beat Hagler was to give him a distorted picture. But this shrewdest of fighters knew it was even more important to distort the picture for the judges. His plan was to "steal" rounds with a few flashy and carefully timed flurries and to make the rest of each three-minute session as unproductive as possible for Hagler by circling briskly away from the latter's persistent pursuit. When he made his sporadic attacking flourishes, he was happy to exaggerate hand speed at the expense of power, and neither he nor two of the scorers seemed bothered by the fact that many of the punches landed on the champion's gloves and arms. This was showboating raised to an art form, and the brilliance with which it was sustained was a tribute to Leonard's wonderful nerve, which is cut from the same flawless diamond as Ali's.

But, however much the slick ploys blurred the perceptions of those on the fevered sidelines, they never broke Hagler. He has a different kind of spirit, but it is no less resolute than Leonard's. The hounding intensity that kept him unbeaten through 11 years from 1976 will soon be a memory, but he had enough left to press on through his early frustrations, throw the superior volume of hurtful punches. I'm convinced Hagler won the fight; a draw, and the retention of the title, was the very least he deserved.

"It's unfair, man, it's unfair," Hagler said helplessly to the master illusionist at the end. That's an old cry and—given the haphazard way boxing judges its heroes—all too often a true one.

Chavez the Machine

An offensive machine and durable as hell, Julio Cesar Chavez carried wicked power in both hands. He tossed and excellent hook to the liver and the jaw, a sharp uppercut on the inside, and a solid left jab (well educated to boot). He was arguably the most devastating body puncher in the history of the sport. His right hand was equally devastating. He threw overhands, uppercuts, and crosses, and developed a short right hook he used in close.

Chavez was nonstop and methodical. He just kept coming. It was nightmarish. Not defensively inept, he would take shots to give shots; but to the dismay of his opponents, he could really take a shot. In his first 91 fights, despite facing the toughest fighters of his day, Chavez was never stopped or knocked off his feet. He never lost in that frame, either, and drew only once, against Pernell Whitaker, another all-time great. How tough was his opposition? Rocky Lockridge, Juan LaPorte, Edwin Rosario, Jose Luis Ramirez, Hector Camacho, Meldrick Taylor - the list goes on.

For those who appreciate junior titles, Chavez held the WBC junior lightweight (1984-1987) and twice held the WBC junior welterweight titles, and successfully defended them 9 and 16 times respectively! Many believe he was the best fighter ever at those weights. I won’t quarrel with those who believe that.

As for the major weight divisions, he won the WBA lightweight title from Edwin Rosario on a brutal eleventh-round stoppage in 1987, defended the title once, then lifted the WBC lightweight title from Jose Luis Ramirez in a technical decision in 1988, thus unifying the world title for the first time since Roberto Duran vacated the title a decade earlier. Chavez fought for the world welterweight championship twice, drawing with Whitaker over 12 rounds, and, then, retiring in his corner against Oscar de la Hoya in the eighth round. Chavez was past his prime for the de la Hoya fight.

His glory moments were his victory over Rosario and then unifying the title against Ramirez, his blowout of Greg Haugen in front of some 130,000 fans in Mexico City, his domination of Hector Camacho, and his war with Meldrick Taylor, in which he prevailed by a twelfth round stoppage in a thrilling come-from-behind contest.

Chavez for the first time in 1994, 14 years after he debuted, against Frankie Randall. That fight was also the first time Chavez had even been knocked off his feet. Chavez regained the title in the rematch.

Chavez is one of the best lightweights in history and, despite never winning the welterweight title, should rank among all-time best welterweights. I put him in the top three all-time lightweights.

Friday, May 15, 2009

Jose Luis Ramirez of Mexico

Jose Luis Ramirez of Mexico was one tough hombre who accomplished a lot in his 17 years as a professional boxer. His name is not well-known, which is a consequence of his low-key manner of conducting himself in public and his being surrounded by flashier boxers. He was in the mix that included such household names (at least boxing households) as Julio Cesar Chavez, Alexis Arguello, and Hector Camacho.

Ramirez started boxing professionally at 14-years-old in 1973. By 1978, he had amassed a record of 43 wins, 37 inside the distance, against only one 10-round decision loss. It was in 1978 that Ramirez took on legendary Mexican knockout artist Ruben Olvares. Olivares sported a record of 82 wins, with 72 knockouts, against 9 defeats and 1 draw. He became world bantamweight champion in 1969, defending the title twice before losing it on a cut eye in 1970. He regained the title in 1971, defended it twice more before losing it in 1972. He then moved up to featherweight and won the vacant WBC featherweight title in 1974, lost it that same year, regained it and lost it again in 1975. In 1978, Olivarez was clearly not the same fighter he was in his glory years, but he was still a forbidable puncher, and he proved too much for the young Ramirez. Ramirez was stopped in the second round. It would be only one of two times across 111 fights that Ramirez would not finish a fight (the other time was on account of an accidental headbutt against Julio Cesar Chavez, which I address later one).

After the Olivarez fight, Ramirez ran his record to 67-2 by the end of 1980, 58 of those wins coming inside the distance. He picked up the Mexican lightweight title in 1979 and was recognized as one of the best lightweights in the world.

In 1980, he was matched with legendary boxer Alexis Arguello (69-5), former WBA featherweight champion and WBC junior lightweight champion. Ramirez surprised the pro-Arguello crowd by flooring Arguello in the sixth round and outboxing the Nicaraguan throughout. Judge James Kenon had the fight 98-95 Ramirez. However, judge Sam Biller voted for Arguello with a score of 97-94. Referee William Conners had the fight 95-94 Arguello. The length of time the officials huddled before announcing the decision suggested to this observer that perhaps a bit of a fix was involved. In my view, Ramirez won the fight. In any case, Ramirez proved before a world audience that he was among the elite in the lightweight division.

In 1981, Ramirez suffered a disappointing 12-round defeat to lightweight phenom Ray Mancini in a fight to earn a shot at the WBC lightweight title, now held by Arguello. Although he only had 19 bouts under his belt, Mancini's perpetual motion style proved to be a riddle Ramirez couldn't solve. Mancini was unsuccessful in his bid to dethrone Arguello, but he would live up to his promise by winning the WBA lightweight title and successfully defending it four times.

Meanwhile, Ramirez pressed on, winning 11 straight fights, 9 inside the distance, earning a shot in 1983 for the WBC title vacated by Arguello. He was matched with undefeated phenom Edwin Rosario, who had won 20 of his 21 fights by knockout, including an impressive three round destruction of perinneal contender Edwin Viruet. The Ramirez-Rosario contest was a closely fought affair, but in the end the judges saw it for Rosario in a unanimous 2-point decision. Rosario would defend his title twice, with one of those coming against highly touted Howard Davis, Jr (26-1-0), before meeting Ramirez again. Things would be different this time. In the rematch, Ramirez rose from two knockdowns to stop Rosario in the fourth round to win the WBC lightweight title.

Rosario and Ramirez would never unfortunately never matched up against. However, Rosario went on to have an outstanding career. He would beat Frankie Randall (23-0) in a thrilling 10-round match that brought the house down, get robbed in a bout for the WBC lightweight title against Hector Camacho (28-0) in 1986, and then win the WBA lightweight title in 1986 in a two-round demolition of Livington Bramble, the man who twice defeated Ray Mancini. Rosario is credited with forever changing the way Camacho fought, making the man defense consciousness to a fault.

In 1985, Ramirez entered the ring with Hector Camacho (26-0). Camacho, one of the best boxers the ring has ever seen, was at his absolute peak at this point. He proved was too slick for Ramirez and outboxed the Mexican the entire way. So it was that Ramirez lost the WBC title in his first defense of it. However, after two title defenses, Camacho relinquished the title to move to welterweight and Ramirez was selected to fight for the vacant title. He was matched with the capable Terrence Ali (33-4-2) in 1987 and won a 12 round decision. He defended his title successfully against Cornelius Boza-Edwards 45-6-1 on a fifth round knockout.

In 1988, Ramirez was matched with future all-time great welterweight Pernell Whitaker. It was only Whitaker's 16th pro fight, but his progress had been so rapid that his handlers believed he was ready for the match. Ramirez won a split decision. The fight remains a matter of dispute, with many arguing that Whitaker was robbed. In this writer's opinion, Whitaker erred in fighting an almost exclusively defensive fight. After 12 rounds of Ramirez making the fight happen, he was, in my view, entitled to the win. I appreciate defensive boxing. However, boxing is also about fighting and there has to be significant offensive effort or at least impressive counterpunching in order to make a case that a win is warranted. Whitaker did neither.

For his fourth defense, Ramirez was matched with the best lightweight since Roberto Duran, WBA champion Julio Cesar Chavez, who was undefeated in 61 fights, winning most of them by knockout. Chavez had won the WBA title by dominating Rosario in one of the most impressive ring performances in recent memory. The fight was significant in that it would be the first time the titles would be unified since Roberto Duran left the division in the late 1970s. Ramirez gave a terrific accounting of himself. He kept the fight within two points on two of the judges cards. However, in the 11th round an accidental headbutt prevented Ramirez from continuing. Chavez was awarded the victory on a technical win.

Chavez left the lightweight division the following year to fight as a welterweight. Ramirez was rematched with Whitaker for the WBC title in 1989 and, this time, was cleanly outboxed. Whitaker put on a show. Ramirez couldn't get his system into gear and was made to look stuck in the mud. Whitaker had indeed come into his greatness at this point and Ramirez was on the slide. He was 32 years old and had been at the sport for nearly 17 years.

Ramirez would fight one more fight, losing a 12-round decision to welterweight Juan Martin Coggi (43-1-2) by wide margins.